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Continuous Double Auction Strategy Model in the Poor Information Environment

Bai Yantao


In continuous double auction (CDA) market, buyers and sellers get the different information, and most of the market participants get the poor information, but few get the comprehensive information. This case always makes buyers and sellers have the different bid-ask at the same good, and this damages the participants’ personal income. Therefore, how to bid-ask as getting poor information has a positive significance on most of market participants. This study based on the perspective of individual benefit, design the bid-ask strategy take account of bid-ask difference, deal or not, through continuous attention in the market for both buyers and sellers. Then use simulation experiment on CDA. The findings show that in the poor information environment, rational utilization the bid-ask difference of buyers and sellers, make a deal can guarantee market participants' individual income.


Continuous double auction, spread strategy, bid-ask spread, individual benefit

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